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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Framers established a federal government of three coequal, coordinate 
branches—each with its own constitutional responsibilities and each charged with 
checking the other two branches. Indeed, separated functions and balance of power 
are the two underlying elements of our bedrock constitutional principle of 
separation of powers.1 The current style of governance in the Unites States poses a 
unique and serious threat to that basic principle. Congressional dysfunction 
prevents the legislative branch from legislating, pushes the executive branch 
toward assuming greater lawmaking authority, and undermines the ability of both 
the judiciary and executive branch to fulfill their own constitutional obligations.  
Moreover, Congress represents the sole available check on many executive 
branch actions. 2  This fact then serves to amplify the concerns over executive 
aggrandizement of power. If the only check against the president is congressional 
action, congressional dysfunction weakens that check.3  
Equally problematic is that all of this is pushing us toward a constitutional 
crisis. 
It is perhaps true, as Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson have pointed out, that 
the term “constitutional crisis” is overused. 4  But when congressional inaction 
forces the president to interpret constitutional text governing congressional process 
differently than Congress, a true crisis is in the making. When legislative 
brinkmanship and dysfunction force public officials, commentators, and even a 
former president to encourage President Obama to invoke an obscure provision in 
the Fourteenth Amendment to unilaterally revoke the debt-ceiling law, we’re 
∗ © 2014 Michael Teter. Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. 
Quinney College of Law. Special thanks to all of the Symposium participants, as well as to 
the entire Utah Law Review staff. In particular, Symposium Editor Megan Baker did a 
tremendous job organizing the event and shepherding this piece through the editing 
process. As always, thank you to Anna Mariz, Atticus Talbot, Milana Prejean, and Theodus 
William for their inspiration and support. 
1 See M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. 
L. REV. 1127, 1167–68 (2000). 
2 This is largely because of self-imposed limitations by the judiciary. The goal of this 
piece is to suggest the judiciary should rethink those doctrines. 
3 It may be true, as Professor Ken Mayer suggests, that the Congress is a weak check, 
see Kenneth R. Mayer, Executive Power in the Obama Administration and the Decision to 
Seek Congressional Authorization for a Military Attack Against Syria: Implications for 
Theories of Unilateral Action, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 821, but it remains a check. 
4 Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crises, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 
709–10 (2009). 
897 
                                                     
898 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
headed toward a constitutional crisis. The way to avoid the demise of separation of 
powers and tamp down on the continuing institutional conflicts that are becoming 
increasingly common and more disconcerting is for the third branch to step into the 
ring and play a central role in resolving these institutional disputes. But is the 
federal judiciary prepared to, and capable of, serving this function? To do so may 
require the courts to overcome conventional notions of the proper role for an 
unelected judiciary, eschew its traditional stance against deciding political 
questions, and relax other self-imposed limits on justiciability, particularly, the 
doctrines of standing and mootness. 
The current state of American governance, then, is what I see as the greatest 
challenge posed to the federal judiciary. The biggest question is whether the 
judiciary is willing to rethink some long-held views and reconsider some well-
established doctrines to address the threat posed to our constitutional framework 
by congressional dysfunction and executive overreach. 
 
II.  THE JUDICIARY’S CHALLENGE: POLICING INTERBRANCH DISPUTES BETWEEN 
CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE 
 
A.  Contextualizing the Problem 
 
Our government is struggling to function. Other Symposium participants have 
addressed this concern, 5  so I will not spill too much ink on this. It is worth 
reiterating, however, that we have a legislature that barely can legislate,6 a depleted 
judiciary and executive branch because of Senate inaction,7 and a Congress that is 
failing to fulfill not only its lawmaking function but also its checking function.8 
In part, because of all of this, we have seen greater institutional conflict—not 
in the constitutionally prescribed manner of checks and balances, but in destructive 
forms that are best exemplified by the fight over recent appointments, the 
government shutdown, and the standoffs over the debt ceiling. While opponents of 
an increased judicial role may look at each of these problems and declare a partial 
victory—Congress and President Obama, after all, did not allow these events to 
lead to a full-scale crisis—I believe that view is flawed. Few, if any, of the recent 
5 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Actually We Should Wait: Evaluating the Obama 
Administration’s Commitment to Unilateral Executive Branch Action, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 
773 (noting that some argue congressional gridlock justifies President Obama’s expansive 
use of presidential power); Terri Peretti, Democracy-Assisting Judicial Review and the 
Challenge of Polarization, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 843 (noting that American policy making is 
increasingly plagued by polarization and gridlock).  
6 See Michael J. Teter, Congressional Gridlock’s Threat to Separation of Powers, 
2013 WISC. L. REV. 1097, 1103–06. 
7  See Sheldon Goldman et al., Obama’s Judicial Appointments in a Time of 
Extraordinary Obstruction, SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK (Aug. 2013), http://www.scho 
larsstrategynetwork.org/sites/default/files/ssn_key_findings_goldman_slotnick_and_schiav 
oni_on_obamas_first_term_judiciary.pdf. 
8 Teter, supra note 6, at 1145. 
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institutional conflicts have been resolved. Instead, they have been delayed, pushed 
back for a few months until the next deadline creates the opportunity for more 
brinksmanship and crises. 
 
B.  The Challenges to the Judiciary Policing Interbranch Disputes 
 
The judiciary, therefore, needs to decide whether it is willing to play a greater 
role in resolving these institutional conflicts between Congress and the executive. 
To be certain, obstacles exist to increased judicial mediating of interbranch 
disputes. As briefly noted above, and discussed more thoroughly below, I see three 
significant challenges to the judiciary. The first is the firm grip that the so-called 
countermajoritarian difficulty has on our collective understanding of the proper 
role of the judiciary. Second, and relatedly, is the judicially created concept of the 
political question doctrine, which constrains federal courts from deciding matters 
better resolved by the “political” branches. Finally, the justiciability concerns over 
standing and mootness could serve to hinder the judiciary’s ability to play a central 
role in deciding institutional conflicts between the legislature and executive. As I 
explain below, I believe the first two obstacles—the countermajoritarian difficulty 
and the political question concern—can, and should, be discounted. The problems 
posed by standing and mootness doctrines may impose enough of a challenge that 
they require a more relaxed approach in cases involving interbranch disputes. 
 
1.  The Countermajoritarian Difficulty 
 
As the only unelected branch of government, the federal judiciary plays a 
unique role in promoting constitutionalism and policing the boundaries of the 
separation of powers. From the nation’s founding, however, critics of a strong 
judiciary have sought to portray the exercise of judicial power as democratically 
illegitimate. 9  The Anti-Federalists who opposed the Constitution’s ratification 
voiced deep concerns about a judiciary “subject to no control,”10 that will “control 
the legislature,”11 and that will serve independent of the desires of the populace.12 
Alexander Hamilton sought to respond to those critiques by noting the judiciary’s 
lack of political authority.13 Indeed, Hamilton famously resorted to labeling the 
judiciary as the “least dangerous” branch.14 Hamilton’s assertions placated few 
among the Anti-Federalists. 
9 See, e.g., THE ANTIFEDERALIST NO. 78, at 223–25 (“Brutus” (likely Robert Yates)) 
(Morton Borden ed., 1965) (arguing that judicial review places the judiciary above control 




13 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 521–30 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
14 Id. at 522. 
 
                                                     
900 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
Moreover, after the election of 1800, when Thomas Jefferson defeated 
President John Adams, marking the first transition of power between two 
competing political parties, the Federalists exploited the antidemocratic nature of 
the judiciary.15 When President Adams and his allies in the Senate expanded the 
federal judiciary three weeks before Jefferson assumed office, and managed to 
nominate and confirm dozens of appointees in just days, Jefferson stated, “[T]he 
[Federalists] have retired into the Judiciary as a stronghold . . . and from that 
battery all the works of Republicanism are to be beaten down and erased.”16 
All of this is to say that the worries over the antidemocratic nature of the 
federal judiciary have existed (and persisted) since even before the nation’s 
founding. The modern version of the dilemma found voice in the 1960s, when 
Alexander Bickel wrote of the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.”17 As the very brief 
history provided above shows, Bickel could hardly claim to be the first to express 
concerns about unelected judges overseeing the politically accountable branches. 
Nevertheless, Bickel’s work did give life to the legal world’s modern obsession 
with the topic.18 Bickel developed and nurtured the idea of the countermajoritarian 
difficulty, labeling judicial review a “deviant institution”19 because “it thwarts the 
will of representatives—of the actual people of the here and now.”20 From law 
school constitutional law courses to legal scholarship to the Supreme Court itself, 
Bickel’s views have found a willing and sympathetic audience. 
It is time to loosen the grip that Bickel’s countermajoritarian critique holds 
over us for a variety of reasons. First, plenty of evidence contemporary with our 
nation’s founding suggests that the Framers did intend for the judiciary to play an 
important role in policing the relationship between the branches.21 How deviant 
can judicial review be, then, if it was an accepted premise of American 
constitutionalism from the get-go? 
Second, as many scholars have noted, Bickel overstates the importance of 
majoritarianism as a framework value of American government. 22  Instead, 
majoritarianism is just one in a list of underlying constitutional principles, joining 
others such as federalism, liberty, anti-arbitrariness, and separation of powers. If 
majoritarianism is not the lodestar that Bickel makes it out to be, then perhaps 
judicial review of interbranch disputes is not so “deviant” and instead serves other, 
equally important, foundational interests. 
15 See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, The Story of Marbury v. Madison: Making Defeat 
Look Like Victory, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 13–17 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2009). 
16 Id. at 15–16 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). 
17 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962). 
18 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy 
in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 464–65 (2003). 
19 BICKEL, supra note 17, at 18. 
20 Id. at 31. 
21 See, e.g., FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 13, at 521–27. 
22 See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 18, at 467; Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, 
Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 533–34 (1998). 
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In addition, Bickel’s approach assumes too much about our electoral system’s 
ability to adequately express majoritarian preferences. This is neither the time nor 
the paper to discuss the failings of our electoral system, but it is fair to say that the 
United States’ system of electing national office holders hardly guarantees that the 
outcomes represent majoritarian preferences, especially for each individual issue 
considered by Congress.23 
Finally, even if one accepts Bickel’s majoritarian impulse, congressional 
dysfunction and the interbranch disputes to which it gives rise actually disturb 
majoritarian principles. Often, congressional inaction occurs because of a willful 
minority’s actions to block the wishes of a legislative majority.24 Judicial review in 
this context would actually serve to restore majoritarianism rather than scuttle it. 
 
2.  The Political Question Doctrine 
 
Related to the concerns over unelected judges overseeing the two elected 
branches, the political question doctrine prevents a court from hearing a matter that 
is otherwise justiciable if the claim presents a “political question.” Much like the 
countermajoritarian difficulty, the political question doctrine enjoys roots in early 
American constitutionalism. In Marbury v. Madison, 25  Chief Justice Marshall 
wrote that “political act[s]” committed to the discretion of the executive are not “to 
be questioned.”26 
The political question doctrine played an important role in various cases 
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For example, the Court 
refused to become involved in a dispute between two factions claiming to be the 
legitimate government of Rhode Island, in part because the executive branch had 
already recognized one group as the bona fide government.27 And in 1912, the 
Court similarly refused to decide the meaning of the Guarantee Clause of the 
Constitution when a party challenged the validity of a statute enacted through voter 
initiative as not consistent with a “republican form of Government.”28  
 In 1962, the Court addressed this history of the political question doctrine in 
the seminal case of Baker v. Carr.29 There, in considering whether the issue of 
malapportioned legislative districts presented a nonjusticiable political question, 
Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion acknowledged that the “political question 
doctrine” is something of a misnomer, as “the mere fact that the suit seeks 
23 For a more in-depth discussion of the topic, see generally Patrick Luff, Captured 
Legislatures and Public-Interested Courts, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 519 (arguing that legal 
scholars should rethink the countermajoritarian difficulty because courts often advance the 
public interest more effectively than legislatures).  
24  See Teter, supra note 6, at 1107–08 (noting that the Senate cloture vote and 
filibuster have placed a “stranglehold” on Senate action). 
25 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
26 Id. at 164. 
27 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 7, 42 (1849). 
28 Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 139–41 (1912). 
29 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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protection of a political right does not mean it presents a political question.”30 
Instead, Justice Brennan focused on the “need for case-by-case inquiry” and 
canvased the field of political question cases to “infer from them the analytical 
threads that make up the political question doctrine.”31 From this review of the 
existing political question jurisprudence, Justice Brennan put forward the six 
“prominent” elements of a political question: (1) “a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department”; (2) “a 
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it”; (3) “the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of the kind clearly 
for nonjudicial discretion”; (4) “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate 
branches of government”; (5) “an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made”; and (6) “the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”32 
With these factors in mind, how could one view the political question doctrine 
as an obstacle to judicial intervention in interbranch disputes? It would seem that 
several of the “prominent” elements are more clearly implicated than others. 
Indeed, I think it is possible to dismiss numbers three, five, and six out of hand. 
After all, resolving disputes between the branches does not require any “initial 
policy determination,” nor does it pose a need for “unquestioning adherence” to a 
political decision already made (say, like having recognized one state’s elected 
officers as the official government of the state). Additionally, the nature of 
interbranch disputes already presupposes “multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments.”33 Thus, the judiciary stepping in to resolve the matter can hardly be 
said to present the potential for embarrassment—at worst, the “potentiality” has 
already been realized by the congressional-executive conflict. 
Nevertheless, that does leave three possible elements to consider. When 
resolving conflicts between the two other branches, is the judiciary likely to be 
faced with a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department”; the “lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards”; or “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of 
government”? A review of the cases in which the Court found such elements 
implicated demonstrates that these remaining concerns over the political question 
doctrine are not applicable in situations involving interbranch disputes arising from 
congressional dysfunction. 
The Court has found a demonstrable constitutional commitment to a 
coordinate branch only when the constitutional text and its history strongly suggest 
that one of the other branches was intended to be the sole decision maker with 
30 Id. at 209. 
31 Id. at 210–11. 
32 Id. at 217. 
33 Id. 
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regard to the issues raised.34 The Court has also concluded that a lack of judicially 
manageable standards arises often in cases presenting a demonstrable commitment 
to a coordinate branch, or in the context of partisan gerrymandering.35 Otherwise, 
as the Court noted in United States v. Munoz-Flores,36 the lack of current standards 
does not mean that “developing such standards will be more difficult in this 
context than any other.”37 Finally, the Court has rejected efforts suggesting that 
judicial review of other branches’ decision making expresses a lack of respect.38 
There is nothing in particular about interbranch disputes that would suggest the 
Court should find such a problem in this context. 
For these reasons, the political question doctrine does not impose a 
particularly difficult obstacle to judicial review of interbranch disputes. Perhaps 
more importantly, the Court has demonstrated a clear willingness to police the 
boundaries of the separation of powers, despite political question concerns. For 
example, the Court did not hesitate to resolve cases involving the use of the 
legislative veto,39 the constitutionality of the independent counsel law,40 or the 
line-item veto,41 all of which presented interbranch disputes. The reason the Court 
felt it could, and should, address the merits of these cases was because it is the 
judiciary’s responsibility to police the boundaries of the separation of powers, 
despite the fact that—quite often—doing so will require it to intervene in 
interbranch conflicts.  
Therefore, I do not think that the political question doctrine truly erects a 
meaningful barrier to judicial review of disputes between Congress and the 
president. To be sure, the Court may hide behind the doctrine if it so chooses, but 
doing so leaves the Court hanging its hat on a linguistic, rather than doctrinal, 
hook.  
 
3.  Standing and Mootness 
 
Assuming courts are willing to cast off the imagined Bickelean shackles of 
countermajoritarianism and also to reject an overly rigid view of the political 
question doctrine, one final obstacle remains. The courts have interpreted the 
34 See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228, 230 (1993) (holding that the 
Senate has sole discretion to choose impeachment procedures under U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, 
cl. 6 and, thus, the issue of an impeachment trial procedure was nonjusticiable political 
question).  
35 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277–78, 281 (2004). 
36 495 U.S. 385 (1990). 
37 Id. at 396 (holding that challenge to misdemeanor law under Origination Clause 
nonjusticiable). 
38 Id. at 390–91. 
39 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986). 
40 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 678–79 (1988). 
41 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448–49 (1998). 
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Article III command that it hear only “cases” and “controversies” to impose 
standing requirements on plaintiffs and to reject claims that have become moot.42 
The constitutional standing doctrine is familiar. It requires that a plaintiff 
demonstrate a cognizable, concrete injury; a causal link between the injury and the 
defendant’s alleged conduct; and, finally, that a favorable judicial decision would 
redress the injury.43 In short, by imposing a standing requirement on parties, the 
Court has sought to “preserve[] the vitality of the adversarial process by 
assuring . . . that the parties before the court have an actual, as opposed to 
professed, stake in the outcome” and that the judiciary’s role does not extend 
beyond its appropriate constitutional balance.44 
In addition to requiring that a party have standing to bring a claim, the case or 
controversy must remain “live.” Specifically, the mootness doctrine requires that 
“[t]he requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the 
litigation . . . must continue throughout its existence . . . .”45 Imposing a mootness 
doctrine on litigants helps ensure that the federal courts do not engage in advisory 
opinions and avoids unnecessary rulings on the merits of a case. 
Each of these justiciability doctrines—but, in particular, that of standing—
serves as an obstacle to orderly judicial review of interbranch disputes. Unlike in 
the case of the “countermajoritarian difficulty” or the political question doctrine, 
both presenting psychological rather than concrete hurdles to judicial review, there 
needs to be a rethinking of standing, mootness, and ripeness doctrines in the 
context of interbranch conflicts. The required changes to those doctrines are 
subtle—minor shifts, not wholesale abandonment—and could be limited to a 
particular set of cases involving separation-of-powers disputes. 
 
(a)  Standing 
 
By limiting who can bring an action, the standing doctrine imposes an 
obstacle to judicial involvement in conflicts between Congress and the executive. 
Perhaps the best example of this is Raines v. Byrd,46 in which the Supreme Court 
dismissed a challenge to the Line Item Veto Act brought by six members of 
Congress. There, the plaintiffs claimed that by granting the president authority to 
“cancel” individual spending items from larger appropriation bills, the Act had 
“unconstitutionally expand[ed] the President’s power.” 47  The Court refused to 
42 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 
43 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
44 Id. at 581; see also Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) 
(“No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of 
government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or 
controversies.”). 
45 U.S. Parole Comm’n. v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980) (quoting Henry P. 
Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1384 
(1973)). 
46 521 U.S. 811 (1997). 
47 Id. at 816. 
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reach the merits on the constitutionality of the law because it held that the 
members lacked standing to bring the suit.48 Insisting on “strict compliance” with 
standing requirements, the Court held that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a 
sufficient personal, concrete injury. 49  Distinguishing Raines from Powell v. 
McCormack,50 where the Court permitted a challenge by Adam Clayton Powell to 
proceed because Congress had refused to seat him, the Court noted that in the case 
of the Line Item Veto Act, the congressmen were alleging that the Act deprived 
them of political power, not a personal right.51 “Their claim,” the Court stressed, 
“is that the Act causes a type of institutional injury (the diminution of legislative 
power), which necessarily damages all Members of Congress and both Houses of 
Congress equally.”52 
The Court then provided a look at other historical disputes between Congress 
and the president—generally involving congressional efforts to limit the 
president’s ability to fire executive branch officials. 53  For example, the Court 
discussed the infamous Tenure of Office Act, which the Fortieth Congress enacted 
over President Andrew Johnson’s veto as a means to limit the president’s authority 
over his cabinet (and to spark an institutional conflict).54 According to the Court, 
were the plaintiffs in Raines to have standing, then “it would appear that President 
Johnson would have had standing to challenge the Tenure of Office Act before he 
ever thought about firing a cabinet member, simply on the grounds that it altered 
the calculus by which he would nominate someone to his cabinet.”55 Rather than 
supporting its holding, the Court, I think, demonstrates the frustrating madness of 
its standing doctrine with regard to interbranch disputes. The Tenure of Office Act 
dispute ended with President Johnson’s impeachment and his near removal from 
office (he was acquitted at his impeachment trial by one vote, which nearly went 
the other way).56  
Why is this the preferred way to resolve interbranch disputes? The Court in 
Raines stated that “if the federal courts had entertained an action to adjudicate the 
constitutionality of the Tenure of Office Act immediately after its passage in 1867, 
they would have been improperly and unnecessarily plunged into the bitter 
political battle being waged between the President and Congress.” 57  This, of 
course, ignores the fact that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court presides over a 
48 Id. at 829–30. 
49 Id. at 819, 829–30. 
50 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
51 Raines, 521 U.S. at 821. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 826–28. 
54 Id. at 826–27. 
55 Id. at 827. 
56  See WILLIAM REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF 
JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 233–35 (1992). 
57 Raines, 521 U.S. at 827. 
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president’s impeachment. 58  Indeed, it ignores the historical record from the 
President Johnson impeachment that shows that Chief Justice Chase could not 
escape playing a critical and substantive role in the “political battle” between 
Republican senators and President Johnson.59 But more importantly, in 1926, the 
Court stated that the original Tenure of Office Act of 1867 was unconstitutional.60 
So, President Johnson was impeached and nearly removed from office as part of an 
interbranch dispute on the basis of an unconstitutional law.  
The Court has rendered it nearly impossible for a political officeholder to 
represent her office’s institutional interests. Just as the six members of the Senate 
and House did not enjoy standing to challenge the Line Item Veto Act because the 
harm they were asserting was to the institution, rather than to their personal 
interests, a president cannot challenge congressional procedures that prevent a vote 
on the president’s executive branch nominees; and, similarly, members of 
Congress cannot challenge the president’s recess appointment of a nominee that 
occurs when Congress does not consider itself in recess. All this, despite the fact 
that the congressional inaction on nominees and the presidential recess 
appointment harms the institutional powers of the other branch.  
By applying an “especially rigorous” 61  standing requirement in cases of 
institutional disputes between Congress and the president, the Court has imposed 
an unnecessary and problematic obstacle to judicial resolution of these conflicts. It 
may be, as the Raines Court implies, that imposing a heightened standing burden 
on congressional members and on the president in such circumstances preserves 
the integrity and legitimacy of the judiciary.62 But it is unclear to me how, exactly. 
Unlike the political question doctrine, the standing requirements are not intended 
to be used to carve out from judicial review a set of substantive matters. Moreover, 
precisely because of this, many of the institutional conflicts that the standing 
doctrine initially serves to shield from judicial review ultimately make their way 
before the courts. The Raines decision was followed by Clinton v. City of New 
York,63 in which the Court struck down the Line Item Veto Act.64 The imaginary 
challenges scoffed at by the Court in Raines—to the Tenure of Office Act brought 
by President Johnson, to the one-house veto brought by the Attorney General, to 
the Federal Election Campaign Act brought by President Ford, and to President 
Coolidge’s pocket veto brought by a member of Congress—all presented real-
world subsequent cases in which the Court was forced to intervene in the dispute.65 
58  Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of the Raines opinion, would preside at 
President Clinton’s impeachment trial just two years later. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 
683 (1997).  
59 See REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 219–35. 
60 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926). 
61 Raines, 521 U.S. at 819. 
62 Id. at 828–29 (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974)). 
63 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
64 Id. at 448–49. 
65 See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); 
The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929); Myers, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
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The cases turned on the same substantive constitutional questions that would have 
been presented to the Court had standing not prevented the earlier resolution. 
Thus, the only benefit the courts gain by refusing to decide disputes involving 
the two branches is time. I do not want to minimize the value of that additional 
time. I recognize, for example, that a court is more favorably positioned to avoid 
undue hostility and threats to its political well-being by resolving the 
constitutionality of the Tenure of Office Act in 1926 than at the heart of the battle 
in 1867. But that benefit must be weighed against two other considerations: the 
distortion of the standing doctrine to accomplish something it is not intended to 
accomplish and the costs of waiting. 
First, the only role that the standing doctrine is supposed to serve is ensuring 
that the proper parties are before the courts and that a true “case” or “controversy” 
exists for the judiciary to resolve. To impose a stricter standing requirement on 
congressional members seeking to validate institutional power because otherwise 
the courts would become involved in a political battle is to ignore the underlying 
function of the doctrine. Second, the costs of imposing a more stringent standing 
doctrine can be quite real—an impeachment, legislative bargains undone, and 
entire executive branch agencies operating under the cloud of constitutional 
suspicion and uncertainty. 
For these reasons, the Court must rethink its standing doctrine with regard to 
interbranch disputes. But what should it do? At the very least, the Court should not 
impose more exacting requirements on members of the other two branches to 
demonstrate standing. Perhaps more importantly, the Court should consider 
expanding the list of cognizable injuries to cover those that involve loss of political 
power or an aggrandizement of power by another branch. There are clear 
constitutional principles involved, and it makes little sense to recognize them as 
such while refusing to regard them as sufficiently concrete to give rise to a 
cognizable injury for standing. Put simply, if the Court is going to police—as it 
should—the constitutional parameters of the separation of powers, it should 






66  The ripeness doctrine, which seeks to avoid ruling on matters that involve 
speculative injuries, also poses a possible obstacle to judicial review of interbranch 
disputes. For example, the President’s recess appointment of members of the NLRB was 
not ripe for review under traditional application of the doctrine until the NLRB took an 
action. See  Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom. 
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013). At that point, a person or entity “injured” 
by the NLRB action could challenge the action. My hope, however, is that by broadening 
the scope of cognizable injuries to include the loss of political power, the degree to which 
ripeness presents a hurdle to judicial review is dramatically reduced. The moment the 
President made the recess appointment, a senator’s political power was reduced. 
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(b)  Mootness 
 
When combined with standing requirements, the mootness doctrine can serve 
to prevent many interbranch disputes from being subject to judicial review. Let me 
offer a far-fetched hypothetical to illustrate the point. A group of ideological 
extremists within one of the two major political parties pushes the U.S. 
government to the brink of fiscal disaster by refusing to allow a vote on a debt-
ceiling increase. After taking all of the extraordinary measures it can to avoid a 
default, the Department of the Treasury is out of cash. In response, the president 
asserts what he believes is his constitutional authority under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to unilaterally raise the debt ceiling.67 A week later, facing intense 
political pressure, the various sides reach agreement on a deal to raise the debt 
ceiling. 
What can be done about the president’s unilateral assumption of authority to 
ignore a bona fide debt-ceiling law in contradiction to Congress’s express will? 
Assuming that a person or entity exists who could demonstrate a cognizable injury 
for standing, and that a challenge is properly filed in federal court, the mootness 
doctrine could stand in the way of its resolution since the unconstitutional behavior 
has ended. Moreover, even if the Court were to expand the concept of cognizable 
injuries to include the loss of political power, as discussed above, this imagined 
scenario would still be moot under current doctrine because political power 
between the branches has returned to its settled equilibrium once the deal to raise 
the debt ceiling was struck. 
But, of course, it would not really. The president was able to assert an 
unconstitutional authority—concretely injuring Congress, as an institution. As long 
as the president and Congress know that the president can act in such a way 
without the courts intervening in the conflict, the balance of power has shifted. 
The answer to this problem comes in two forms. The first relates back to 
standing. If courts recognize the loss of political institutional power as a 
cognizable injury, then the injury continues even after the two sides have 
negotiated a resolution to the specific matter at hand. There is, in mootness 
doctrine parlance, a collateral injury that remains, which leaves the case or 
controversy alive. 
The second approach requires a liberalization of the mootness doctrine’s 
exception for wrongs capable of repetition yet evading review.68 To qualify for this 
exception, the Court demands that the challenged action be in “duration too short 
to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration” and that there exist “a 
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same 
67 The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including 
debts incurred for payments of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing 
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. 
68 See S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514–15 (1911) (holding that a 
challenge to an Interstate Commerce Commission’s expired order could proceed because it 
was “capable of repetition, yet evading review”). 
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action again.”69 The problem with the jurisprudence surrounding this exception is 
that the cases show quite clearly that the injury must be one of “inherently limited 
duration so that it is likely to always become moot before federal court litigation is 
completed.”70 Though possibly too short in duration, there is nothing inherent in 
the president’s aggrandizement of power or the Senate’s continued use of pro 
forma sessions to prevent recess appointments that would allow this exception to 
be invoked. 
Moreover, because the Court currently does not recognize the loss of political 
power as a cognizable injury, any case would need to be brought by a third party 
“harmed” by the president’s or Congress’s actions. That party would not be able to 
meet the second prong of the exception, which requires a reasonable expectation 
that the complaining party will be subject to the same action, especially because it 
would be difficult to prove that there is a “sufficient likelihood” that the president 
or Congress will engage in the same behavior, which will harm the same plaintiff. 
Therefore, the Court needs to dispense with the requirement that the 
“complaining party” be subject to the same action. Instead, the Court should focus 
on the nature of the action and determine whether the president or Congress could 
act similarly in the future.71 If nothing prevents the president or Congress from 
taking the same challenged action, the Court should allow the case to proceed. 
 
III.  UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGE AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS THROUGH THE 
RECESS APPOINTMENTS LITIGATION 
 
In critiquing the Court’s applications of standing and mootness, I do not mean 
to suggest that these justiciability doctrines are unimportant. Just the opposite—
they help enforce important constitutional and political values. In my judgment, 
however, those principles are not served in cases involving interbranch disputes. 
Instead, they erect unnecessary and costly barriers to judicial intervention in 
conflicts between the two other branches. 
As this Article goes to print, the Court is set to decide National Labor 
Relations Board v. Noel Canning. 72 The case arises out of President Obama’s 
recess appointment of three members of the five-member National Labor Relations 
69 Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 725 (2008). 
70 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 120 (4th 
ed. 2011). 
71 To an extent, this matches another mootness exception that holds that a case is not 
moot if the defendant voluntarily ceases the complained-of behavior if the defendant is free 
to return to it at any time. See United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass’n., 393 
U.S. 199, 203 (1968). The problem with this exception, however, is that the political deals 
ending these confrontations often include statutory ratifications of the conduct. Statutory 
changes are enough to render a case moot. See, e.g., Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 132 
(1977) (holding that “intervening legislation . . . rendered moot . . . the claims of the . . . 
plaintiffs”). 
72 No. 12-1281. 
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Board (NLRB).73 This case is worth considering here for several reasons. First, it 
illustrates the very type of constitutional, interbranch dispute that is becoming 
increasingly common in the age of congressional dysfunction. Second, and more 
importantly, it serves to illustrate how several of the very issues I identified 
previously, namely, the political question doctrine, standing, and mootness, could 
all be used to prevent judicial resolution of the substantive issue presented by this 
dispute.74 Finally, it shows, perhaps, an increasing willingness on the part of the 
Court to disregard those traditional barriers to judicial resolution, making more 
plausible the proposals I offered earlier regarding standing and mootness. 
President Obama originally nominated three members to serve five-year terms 
on the Board.75 Senate Republicans blocked a vote on all three nominees, at which 
point President Obama recess appointed each of them to the Board.76 While the 
recess appointment power is clearly delineated in the Constitution’s text, Congress 
had sought to curb President Obama’s (and past presidents’) ability to make such 
appointments by holding pro forma sessions every three days. 77  During such 
sessions, often a single senator would convene the chamber and then, immediately, 
adjourn.78 By holding such sessions every three days, Congress believed it had 
never “recessed,” and, therefore, the President could not make a recess 
appointment.79 
Nevertheless, the Obama Administration labeled such efforts a “gimmick” 
and interpreted the recess appointments clause in a way that allows the president to 
make such appointments.80 Thus, we have a clear interbranch dispute: Congress 
believes that it never was in recess, while President Obama thinks otherwise. If 
Congress is correct, the appointment of these three members to the Board—as well 
73  For a richer discussion of this case, see John C. Roberts, The Struggle Over 
Executive Appointments, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 725. 
74 As discussed earlier, I do not believe that the countermajoritarian difficulty can 
truly be implicated in disputes between the two “political” branches precisely because both 
Congress and the President can lay claim to representing the democratic will. 
75 Roberts, supra note 73, at 725. 
76 See Mark Walsh, SCOTUS Ponders Whether the President Can Make Appointment 
While Congress Is Out, ABAJOURNAL.COM (Jan. 1, 2014, 3:50 AM), http://www.abajourna 
l.com/mobile/mag_article/scotus_ponders_whether_the_president_can_make_appointment 
s_while_congress. 
77  Pete Williams & Tom Curry, High Court Agrees to Hear Obama Recess 
Appointment Case, NBCNEWS.com (Jun. 24, 2013, 6:51 AM), http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews. 
com/_news/2013/06/24/19116038-high-court-agrees-to-hear-obama-recess-appointments-c 
ase?lite (“During the George H.W. Bush administration, Democrats came up with the idea 
of pro forma sessions, in which the body was gaveled to order then immediately adjourned 
for another few days. They claimed that because the Senate remained in session, recess 
appointments could not be made.”). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 George Zornick, Obama Bucks GOP, Nominates CFPB Chief, NATION OF CHANGE 
(Jan. 5, 2012), http:/ /www.nationofchange.org/obama-bucks-gop-nominates-cfpb-chief-13 
25782277.  
 
                                                     
2014] JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN INTERBRANCH DISPUTES 911 
as Richard Cordray, to head the Consumer Financial Protection Board—was 
unconstitutional. In many ways, this is the Recess Appointment Clause’s version 
of the Fourteenth Amendment debt-ceiling “hypothetical” discussed above. Who 
knows what controversy or crisis is next? We need not just a resolution to each 
particular dispute, but a mechanism for settling questions of interbranch 
disagreements. Unless the Court is willing to play that role, it is much more likely 
that the Chief Justice will be playing the unwanted role of presider at another 
politically precipitated and motivated impeachment. 
The political question doctrine, as well as the standing and mootness 
doctrines, unnecessarily complicate judicial resolution of the Noel Canning case. It 
is possible, though fortunately at this stage unlikely, that the Court could conclude 
that the political question doctrine prevents judicial resolution of the meaning of 
the Recess Appointment Clause. 81  Does the Constitution textually commit the 
matter of making recess appointments to the president? Or, perhaps, the 
Constitution gives Congress the authority to decide when it is or is not in recess? 
Are there judicially discoverable standards for determining what constitutes a 
recess? Will a decision in the case show a lack of respect for one of the other 
branches?82 As is made obvious from my earlier discussion, I do not believe that 
any of these questions—even if answered in the affirmative—ought to prevent the 
Court from deciding this matter. Yes, the issue is surely political, but the doctrine’s 
true concerns are rightfully focused on matters of intrabranch governance and 
foreign policy decisions already made. When a case involves neither of these 
issues, and instead focuses on an interbranch dispute about constitutional meaning, 
the judiciary is the appropriate place for resolving the competing interpretations. 
But is the heart of the dispute really between the NLRB and Noel Canning, a 
soft-drink bottling company found to have committed an unfair labor practice? Or, 
in deciding this case, will the Court be resolving a conflict between Congress and 
the president? To me, the answer is obvious: the question presented focuses 
exclusively on matters of presidential and congressional power. The NLRB and 
Noel Canning are mere puppets, forced to mouth the arguments that the real parties 
in interest are prevented from making themselves because of the Court’s standing 
jurisprudence. If, instead, the Court were to recognize a loss of political power as a 
cognizable concrete injury, the issue would be more squarely, accurately, and 
timely presented.83 
81 I say unlikely because the Court did not order the parties to address the political 
question doctrine in their briefs. 
82 Professor Victor Williams filed an amicus brief asking the Court to grant certiorari 
in the matter and find that the issue presented a nonjusticiable political question. Amicus 
Curiae Brief of Professor Victor Williams in Support of Petitioner, Noel Canning v. NLRB, 
705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 133 S. Ct. 
2861 (2013) (12-1281).  
83 Again, ripeness would not pose a problem either, as at the moment the President 
made the recess appointment in contradiction to Congress’s intent, the political injury 
would have been particularized and concrete. 
 
                                                     
912 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
Speaking of timing, the case may soon be moot. In July 2013, Senate 
Republicans reached a deal with Senate Democrats to permit a vote on new 
nominees to the NLRB.84 As of July, the NLRB is fully constituted and can act 
accordingly.85 The Board, as newly constructed, could possibly ratify the orders 
that gave rise to the dispute between Noel Canning and the NLRB.86 If that occurs, 
there would no longer be a live controversy between the two parties. Moreover, 
Noel Canning may not be able to demonstrate it has standing to proceed with the 
action. After all, judicial resolution will not redress the company’s injury since the 
NLRB will have readopted its previous finding that the company engaged in unfair 
labor practices. 
Of course, this is only a problem because of the Court’s standing doctrine. If 
Senate Republicans could litigate their own claim, then the deal that allowed the 
confirmation of three members to the NLRB would not moot the issue of the recess 
appointment. But the Court could also permit the case to proceed through a more 
relaxed version of the mootness exception, as discussed above. 
This case, then, demonstrates both the reasons for relaxing standing and 
mootness, as well as, perhaps, an increased willingness on the Court’s part to 




The purpose of this Symposium was to highlight the current challenges facing 
the federal branches in governing the United States. As has often been the case, the 
judiciary’s most difficult task stems from the political dynamics driving the other 
branches. The judiciary cannot solve the current dysfunction in Congress, but it 
can act as a mitigating force, helping to stave off a constitutional crisis. Only time 
will tell whether the courts will embrace that role. 
 
84 Emily Heil, Senate’s No-Nukes Deal Yields Approval of NLRB Nominees, WASH. 




86 This would require the Court to remand the case back to the NLRB so that the 
agency had jurisdiction over the matter. A court concerned about mootness would take that 
step. 
 
                                                     
